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1 Introduction
The establishment of the European Common Market in the 1960s, and its transforma-
tion into the European Union internal market in the early 1990s, recognized the need
(for the well functioning of the internal market) for tax harmonization of national tax
systems.1 During the last two decades the academic literature (a review of the literature
is postponed until Section 2) has paid particular attention to the welfare properties of
tax harmonization, focusing in particular on economic environments with perfect or im-
perfect competition in the goods market, with and without local public goods and under
two dierent tax principles (`destination' and `origin').
The objective of this paper is to revisit the issue regarding the desirability of indirect
tax harmonization, but to do so from a dierent perspective: That of global public
goods.2 In particular, this paper asks: Does, starting from any tax-distorting equilib-
rium, tax-harmonization deliver potential Pareto improvements in the presence of global
public goods? If not, what additional elements are required to support a Pareto im-
provement? And, nally, does the answer to the above questions hinge upon the tax
principle, destination or origin, in place? The central question of interest here is thus
whether there are circumstances in which tax-harmonization is part of a globally ecient
response to existing ineciencies from taxation and global public goods provision.3 This
is, clearly, an important (and general) perspective capturing the element of the policy
concern that relates directly to cooperative policy. It will be shown that tax harmoniza-
tion |combined with an appropriate way of allocating revenues|does in general deliver
Pareto improvements.4
1The EC Treaty, and under Article 93, requires the European Union Council of Ministers to adopt
provisions for the harmonization of Member States' rules in the area of indirect taxation. Indeed, tax
harmonization has been quite pronounced for indirect taxation, following the adoption of a common
VAT tax system. Although the discussions regarding indirect taxation in the EU context has shifted in
recent years towards minimum taxation, tax harmonization remains high on the policy agenda regarding
environmental taxation.
2The model is, in fact, general enough to encompass the case in which the public goods exhibit local
characteristics. We turn to this later on.
3By existing ineciencies we mean, in the broadest sense, those ineciencies from taxation (and pub-
lic goods provision) arising in any tax-distorting equilibrium, including, of course, the non-cooperative
one. Since focusing on the non-cooperative equilibrium gives an important perspective, Appendix C
characterizes this equilibrium and provides existence results for potential Pareto improvements. See also
Navrouzoglou (2012) for an analysis of the cooperative equilibrium in the presence of a global pollution
externality.
4There is a sizeable literature dealing with the eciency properties of formula-based grants between
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With a notable exception to which we turn to shortly in Section 2, the issue of global
public goods and tax harmonization has been rather neglected in the literature. This
neglect is rather surprising given that: (a) There is a wide range of public goods that
share the characteristics of global public goods (the most obvious ones being environ-
mental clean up, measures for the prevention of infectious diseases, and world peace and
international security), and (b) the convergence of tax systems is still an issue that is
high on the policy agenda.5
The analytics show that, starting from any tax-distorting equilibrium, harmonization of
taxes towards a weighted average target-tax does generate Pareto improvements, but it
does so|unless global public goods are provided following the Samuelson rule|under
two conditions: Availability of unrequited transfers between governments and conditional
revenue changes that are consistent with the provision of global public goods relative to
the Samuelson rule. The rst condition, as will be seen later on, implies that transfers
are designed in such a way that the overall gains from the provision of global public
goods are distributed among countries, whereas the second ensures that any excess rev-
enue gains to be had, conditional upon the tax-harmonizing reforms, is distributed in
such a way that the ineciency in global public good provision is mitigated. Under
these conditions, tax harmonization results in a potential Pareto improvement. And,
interestingly, this is true independently of the tax principle in place (destination or ori-
gin). This result reinforces, in some sense, the initially held belief of both academics
and policy commentators that tax harmonization is desirable. But such statement, the
analysis here will show, needs to be qualied: Tax harmonization, starting from any
tax-distorting equilibrium, is desirable as long as it is supplemented with a simple form
of transfers between governments and the reforms deliver the appropriate conditional
revenue changes.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the literature, while Section
3 provides the background against which the analysis is developed. Sections 4 deals with
asymmetric jurisdictions. These grants have been shown, if supplemented with lump sum transfers, to
neutralize the eciency loss caused by tax competition among lower-level governments. On this see,
among others, Wildasin (1989, 1991), and Smart (1998, 2007). The transfers here perform a similar
role.
5For a recent contribution that discusses issues of ecient provision of global public goods, see
Sandmo (2006) and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2012).
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destination-based indirect tax harmonization, whereas Section 5 analyzes origin-based
indirect tax harmonization. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Related literature
A step towards formally evaluating the welfare consequences of indirect tax harmoniza-
tion was taken by Keen (1987, 1989) who, within a perfectly competitive environment,
established that a move of destination-based commodity taxes (commodities are taxed
by|and revenues accrue to|the country that nal consumption takes place) towards
an appropriately weighted6 tax average would indeed generate potential Pareto improve-
ments.7 Subsequently, such a conclusion|but for a dierent weighted8 tax average|was
also shown to hold under the origin principle of taxation (commodities are taxed by|and
revenues accrue to|the country that produces them), Lopez-Garcia (1996).
A limitation of this early work, however, concerned with the allocation of tax revenues:
Tax revenues were returned to consumers in a lump-sum fashion and, thus, potentially
important eects through public good expenditure were ignored. Delipalla (1997) incor-
porated local public goods into the framework of Keen (1987) and showed that the Keen's
(1987) tax-harmonizing reforms under the destination principle can lead to a potential
Pareto improvement9 under a fairly restrictive condition: That of the tax-harmonizing
reforms satisfying conditional revenue neutrality.10 This is also true under the origin
principle of taxation, Kotsogiannis, Lopez-Garcia and Myles (2005).11
The case of imperfectly competitive markets has also received some attention|Keen
and Lahiri (1993), Keen, Lahiri and Raimondos-Mller (2002), and Kotsogiannis and
Lopez-Garcia (2007)|verifying, to a large extent, the conclusions, regarding the desir-
6The weights, under the destination principle, being the demand responses of the participating
countries. There is a fairly sizeable literature on piecemeal Pareto-improving tax reforms but Keen
(1987, 1989) is the rst to focus on tax-harmonizing ones.
7Meaning that the country that gains from tax harmonization compensates the one that loses, and
still is better o. Section 3 returns to this.
8The weights, under the origin principle, being the supply responses of the participating countries.
9See also Lahiri and Raimondos-Mller (1998), and Lopez-Garcia (1998).
10Conditional revenue neutrality requires that, conditional on the tax-harmonizing reforms, global
tax revenues remain unchanged.
11Lockwood (1997), specializing the production technology, has established alternative conditions for
Pareto-improving harmonization.
3
ability of tax harmonization, derived by the earlier literature. Keen and Lahiri (1998)
investigate the welfare consequences of switching from the destination to the origin prin-
ciple. This analysis has been extended to include trade costs (Hauer, Schjelderup and
Stahler (2000)), product dierentiation (Hauer and Puger (2004), and Hashimzade,
Khovadaisi and Myles (2005)), country characteristics and preferences over tax princi-
ples (Hashimzade, Khovadaisi and Myles (2011)). There is an extensive literature that
compares destination- and origin-based commodity taxes. Lockwood (2001) presents an
excellent unied account of the early literature.
With the risk of oversimplication, a common theme emerging from the contributions
that have explicitly considered local public goods (either within a perfectly or imperfectly
competitive environment) is that tax harmonization might be more dicult to deliver
Pareto improvements in the presence of such goods. While this is generally true (and
will be re-conrmed by the analytics here), it does not mean that tax harmonization is
a bad policy. To the contrary, tax harmonization|combined with an appropriate way
of allocating revenues|may be (and indeed it will be shown to be) a potentially Pareto
improving scal policy.
An earlier contribution that discusses the implications for tax competition and ine-
ciency in public good provision in the context of global public goods is Bjorvatn and
Schjelderup (2002). They show that|in the canonical model of capital tax competition
(with perfectly competitive goods and factors markets)|international spillovers from
public goods reduce tax competition. Like Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002), the analy-
sis here considers global public goods. Unlike that contribution, however, the focus here
is not (directly) on tax competition but on harmonization of taxes. This is, clearly, an
important (and general) perspective capturing the element of the policy concern that
relates directly to cooperative policy.
3 A simple model
The issues identied in the preceding discussion will be addressed within an imperfectly
competitive environment. The reason for this is that most markets are neither too small,
so to eectively take the market price as given, nor there are many cases of private-sector
rms without any competition. The predominant market form is oligopoly.
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The model is that of Kotsogiannis and Lopez-Garcia (2007), extended to allow for non-
linear demand and cost functions, and it has also been appropriately modied to deal
with global public goods. The world consists of two countries called `home' and `foreign'
(variables pertaining to the foreign country being indicated by an asterisk) with a single
representative consumer residing in each. Each country produces two tradeable goods.
The rst one is produced under constant returns to scale by a perfectly competitive rm
that uses a single factor of production that is xed in supply (and suppressed from the
analysis). This good is untaxed and taken as the numeraire in both countries. The sec-
ond good is homogenous and produced by a single rm in each country. The consumer
price for this good in the home (foreign) country is denoted by Q (Q). Demand for this
good in the home (foreign) country is denoted by12
D(Q) (D(Q)) with D0(Q) < 0 (D0(Q) < 0) : (1)
Both rms have nonlinear cost structures given by
C(X) (C (X)) with C 0(X) > 0 (C0 (X) > 0) and C 00(X)  0 (C00 (X)  0) ;
(2)
where X (X) is the quantity produced by the home (foreign) rm.
The tradeable good may be supplied by the rm of either the home or the foreign country.
The implication of this is that either country can be an exporter or importer. Market
clearing for the world requires that
D +D = X +X : (3)
Events in the model unfold in the following stages. In stage one, governments set taxes.
As noted earlier, the analysis will not restrict attention to a particular tax equilibrium,
but will seek to characterize the welfare implications of tax-harmonization starting from
any tax-distorting equilibrium. Because of this, the type of conjectures held by the
governments will be left unspecied. In stage two, and given taxes, rms make their
production decision holding Nash conjectures against each other. Then prots, tax
revenues and utilities are realized.
12Derivatives are denoted by primes.
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4 Destination principle of taxation
Under the destination principle of taxation, arbitrage requires that producer prices across
countries are equalized. Denoting the international price by P , consumer prices are then
given by
Q = P + td ; Q
 = P + td ; (4)
where td (t

d) is the specic tax rate on consumption in the home (foreign) country. Prots
for the home country rm, denoted by , and for the foreign country rm, denoted by
, are given, respectively, by
 = PX   C(X) ;  = PX   C(X) : (5)
The revenues obtained from taxing the demand of the tradeable good in each country are
used to provide a non-tradeable public good, denoted by G (G) in the home (foreign)
country. These goods are termed global public goods and both have the characteristic of
being `pure' in the Samuelson sense: That is, the enjoyment of the public good by the
citizen in the home (foreign) country does not diminish its availability for the citizen in
the foreign (home) country. The use of unrequited transfers (in terms of the numeraire
good) between governments will be initially assumed away and introduced only when
required. Given that td (t

d) and D(D
) are the destination-based tax and demand in the
home (foreign) country, respectively, public good provision in the two countries is given
by13
G = tdD ; G
 = tdD
 : (6)
The per-unit cost of public good in both countries is xed and, for simplicity, normalized
to be equal to 1.14
The private goods are perfect substitutes and so, for given destination-based taxes td
and td, the world price P depends only on the world production X +X
. Substituting
(4) into (1) and that into (3) one obtains
P (X +X) ; (7)
13Of course, dierent public goods require a dierent modeling framework. Here it is taken that the
global public goods aect the utility of consumers and not the production capabilities of rms.
14Notice that the analysis is not concerned with which country will provide the public good. What it
is concerned with is whether, given that countries provide global public goods, tax harmonization can
deliver a potential Pareto improvement. In this context, the assumption that both countries are equally
ecient in the production of global public goods is not a restrictive one.
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with, in particular, following from (3),
P 0 = (D0 +D0) 1 < 0 ; (8)
where the inequality follows from the property of the demand functions in (1).
Firms maximize prots, taking the scal instruments of the two countries as given,
with|following from (5) and (7)|setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost15
P + P 0X = C 0 ; (9)
P + P 0X = C0 : (10)
Prots in each country are assumed to accrue to the representative consumer of that
country and so indirect utility in the home and foreign country is, respectively, of the
form
V (Q;; G;G) = CS(Q)++ (G;G) ; V (Q;; G; G) = CS(Q)++ (G; G) ;
(11)
where CS(Q) (CS(Q)) is the consumer's surplus (the utility obtained from purchasing
the private good at price Q (Q)), and  (G;G) ( (G; G)) is the utility from global
public goods in the home (foreign) country.16 Notice also that (11) does not place any
restriction on the relationship between G and G, and, therefore, the model allows for
the possibility that the two public goods are complements in consumption (and so total
consumption matters) in the sense that  (G+G) or that the two countries provide two
distinctively dierent public goods (with utility being  (G;G)).
Attention now turns to the tax-harmonizing reforms.
Destination-based tax-harmonizing reforms
The theoretical literature referred to in Section 2 has looked primarily at tax-harmonizing
reforms that feature a convergence of the initial taxes towards a common target-tax, with
15Second order conditions are assumed to hold. Appendix A discusses, though briey, issues related
to the stability of the equilibrium in the Cournot competition stage of the model.
16The underlying assumption here is that utility is additively separable between the (sub)utility from
private and public goods, with the (sub)utility function associated with private goods being quasi-linear
(with the linear part being the utility derived from the consumption of the numeraire good).
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the target-tax being an average of the initial taxes. The destination-based tax reform,
in the present context, takes the form
dtd
dtd

= 

 (Hd   td)
  (Hd   td)

; (12)
where  is a small positive number and  ;   are arbitrary but positive numbers. The
target-tax Hd is a weighted average of the existing tax structures|where the weights
depend upon the local demand responses D0 and D0|and is given by17
Hd =
 D0
 D0 +  D0
td +
 D0
 D0 +  D0
td : (13)
Making use of (13) in (12), the change in the tax rates required by harmonization is
given by
dtd =
  D0
 D0 +  D0
(td   td) ; (14)
dtd =  
  D0
 D0 +  D0
(td   td) ; (15)
which imply that
D0dtd =  D0dtd : (16)
Equations (14)-(16) have an interesting implication. They imply that (a claim shown in
Appendix A) the international price P , and so the world supply of the tradeable good
X + X, remain unchanged (and so does world demand). It is, thus, intuitive that, in
this case, the welfare consequences of tax harmonization will depend upon the distortion
imposed on world consumer surplus as well as the revenue impact (appropriately weighted
by the marginal valuation of the global public goods) of tax harmonization.
To see this perturb (11) and add to its foreign counterpart to obtain, after using (16)
and the fact that the reforms imply dP = dX = dX = 0,
dV + dV  = [( G +  G   1) (Q=e+ td)  ( G +  G   1) (Q=e + td)  (td   td)]
 D0 D0
 D0 +  D0
(td   td) ; (17)
where e = D0Q=D (e = D0Q=D) denotes the home (foreign) country's price elasticity
of demand.
17It has to be noted that the tax-harmonizing reform in (12) is more general than the one that has
frequently appeared in the literature, and in particular in Keen (1987, 1989). The generality here stems
from the fact that the convergence of taxes is not uniform but it is weighted by  and  . Notice
also that the weights of the target-tax Hd, given by  D
0= ( D0 +  D0) and  D0= ( D0 +  D0),
are|following from the fact that D0; D0 < 0 and  ;  > 0|strictly positive.
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Condition (17) shows that the welfare consequences of tax harmonization, starting from
any tax-distorting equilibrium, depend upon the balance of three terms.
The rst term in (17), and given by ( G +  

G   1) (Q=e+ td), gives the impact of the
tax-harmonizing reforms on world welfare, an impact that depends on the deviation of
the home country's global public good provision from the Samuelson rule (weighted by
Q=e+ td, an expression that relates to the change in the home country's tax revenues).
The second term, given by ( G +  G   1) (Q=e + td), gives, too, the impact of the tax-
harmonizing reforms on global welfare, an impact that depends on the deviation of the
foreign country's public good provision from the Samuelson rule (weighted by Q=e+td,
which relates to the change in the foreign country's revenues). The third term, given by
td   td, is not related to global public good provision but gives the (dierence in the)
change of deadweight loss, for given international price, due the change in consumer
prices in both countries (as a consequence of tax harmonization).
Close inspection of the terms identied in the preceding paragraph shows that their
balance|and so the existence of potential Pareto improvements|cannot be easily es-
tablished. The diculty arises from the rst and second terms, which capture the revenue
impact of the change in the tax bases in the two countries, as a consequence of tax har-
monization. And these are terms that the tax-harmonizing reforms are not designed to
account for.18
One natural benchmark case to consider is that in which (the global) public goods are
provided according to the (modied) Samuelson rule and so  G +  

G = 1 for the home
country and  G +  G = 1 for the foreign country. This is clearly an extreme case,
and to some extent implausible, but it does transparently remove eects arising from
the ineciencies in global public good provision in the two countries. In this case (17)
reduces to
dV + dV  =   (td   td)2
 D0 D0
 D0 +  D0
> 0 ; (18)
and so it is only the impact of the tax-harmonizing reform on global deadweight loss that
matters for welfare. This has some straightforward intuition. Since the tax-harmonizing
reforms imply that the home country (but also the world supply of) production (and so
18It can be shown that, in general, reforms that deliver potential Pareto improvements do exist. It is
the identication of these reforms, however, that is the dicult task. On this see Karakosta (2009).
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the international price of the tradeable good) remains constant at the pre-reform level,
tax harmonization implies that there is no change in prots and so in utility. What is
left, therefore, is the change in the deadweight loss from consumption. But this confers
an unambiguous gain to consumers. The reason for this is that, with the world price of
the tradeable good being unchanged, global deadweight loss is reduced by convergence
of taxes towards a weighted average of the initial taxes.19 To emphasize:
Proposition 1 With taxes being levied under the destination principle and public goods
being global, starting from any tax-distorting equilibrium in which td 6= td, the tax-
harmonizing reforms in (12) and (13) deliver a potential Pareto improvement if both
countries follow the (modied for the case of global public goods) Samuelson rule of
global public good provision.
In one sense, this result strengthens the argument in favor of tax harmonization. But it
is the explicit recognition that the level of global public good provision will in general
dier from that required by the Samuelson rule that ought to concern us. This concern,
however, it will be emphasized shortly, will reinforce the view for the need of a proper
role of a simple form of intergovernmental transfers.20
Suppose now that there exist unrequited transfers between governments that can be
optimally set at a stage before tax harmonization takes place.21 In this case, it can be
straightforwardly veried that maximization of (17) implies that22
 G +  

G =  G +  

G  Ed ; (19)
19This is the exact analogue of Kotsogiannis and Lopez-Garcia (2007), carrying over unchanged to
the case in which tax revenues nance global public goods.
20And in particular so within the European Union where this particular form of tax harmonization
has been central in policy discussions during the last two decades.
21These transfers can be rationalized by assuming that there is some intervention of some outside
agency (for example, a supranational government). While this agency can make use of such transfers
(in an optimal sense and satisfying its budget constraint), it cannot decide on tax issues. This, in some
sense, is consistent with the workings of the European Union: While European Union decision-making on
tax matters requires unanimity (implying that tax-harmonization will only be implemented if it delivers
a potential Pareto improvement, a requirement imposed in the present analysis) intergovernmental
transfers do not.
22To see this, notice that in this case (6) becomesG = tdD+B for the home country andG
 = tdD
 B
for the foreign (where B denotes unrequited transfers in terms of the numeraire good). Perturbing (17)
with respect to B implies that dV + dV  = [( G +  G)  ( G +  G)] dB which, upon setting equal to
zero, gives (19).
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and so, as one would expect, the marginal valuations for the global public goods are
equalized.23 In this case (17) reduces to
dV + dV  = (Ed   1) d (G+G)  (td   td)2
 D0 D0
 D0 +  D0
; (20)
where d (G+G) denotes the change in global revenues as a consequence of tax harmo-
nization given by
d (G+G) = [(Q=e+ td)  (Q=e + td)]
 D0 D0
 D0 +  D0
(td   td) : (21)
(20)|together with (21)|shows that there is an appealing way of expressing what is
required for destination-based tax harmonization to deliver a potential Pareto improve-
ment: All is required is that, conditional on the tax-harmonizing reforms, the direction
of under/over provision of global public good provision (relative to the Samuelson rule)
takes the same sign as the direction of the change in global tax revenues: If global public
goods are under-provided (over-provided) relative to the Samuelson rule, in the sense
that Ed > 1 (Ed < 1), and also, following from (21), d(G + G
) > 0 (d(G + G) < 0),
then dV + dV  > 0 and so tax-harmonization delivers a potential Pareto improvement.
There is a simple intuition behind this result. Tax harmonization not only reduces global
deadweight loss (the second term in the right-hand-side of (20)) but also changes global
tax revenues in such a way that there is an eciency gain, relative to the Samuelson rule,
in global public good provision in the two countries (the rst term in the right-hand-side
of (20)). Summarizing the preceding discussion:24
Proposition 2 With taxes being levied under the destination principle and public goods
being global, starting from any tax-distorting equilibrium in which td 6= td, the tax-
harmonizing reforms in (12) and (13) deliver a potential Pareto improvement if there
exist unrequited transfers that can be optimally set, and the tax-harmonizing reforms
are conditional revenue increasing (decreasing) when the global public goods are under-
provided (over-provided) relative to the Samuelson rule.
23And to the marginal cost which is equal to 1 in both countries.
24Suppose for instance|something that, arguably, seems to be a very restrictive requirement|the
reforms are conditional neutral (as in Delipalla (1997)). In this case d (G+G) = 0, implying that the
welfare loss of one country (as a consequence of tax harmonization) is exactly oset by the welfare gain
of the other. In this case (17) reduces to (18) and so the tax-harmonizing reforms in (12) and (13)
deliver a potential Pareto improvement.
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Outside this case (and the one emphasized in Proposition 1), it is still possible to identify
situations in which the tax-harmonizing reforms deliver a potential Pareto improvement,
even without the use of unrequited transfers. Suppose, to see this, that td > t

d, that is
the home country is the high tax one, and both countries under-provide the global public
good|with respect to the Samuelson rule of Proposition 1|in the sense that  G+ 

G > 1
and  G + 

G > 1. Then (12) and (13) entail a potential Pareto improvement whenever
(Q=e+ td)   (Q=e + td) > 0; a condition that relates to the position of each country
on the (own) Laer curve.25 This, in turn, results in a revenue gain for both countries
which, coupled with the under-provision of the global public goods in both countries,
implies that dV + dV  > 0.
Interestingly, the conclusions reached thus far regarding the desirability of tax harmoniza-
tion hold|again starting from any tax-distorting equilibrium|even if governments pro-
vide local public goods. In the present framework, this will be the case if  G =  G = 0.
Unrequited transfers between governments are still needed here in order to equalize the
marginal valuation for local public goods consumption (and not internalize global ex-
ternalities as in the case of global public goods), replacing (19) with  G =  

G  Ed.
With equalized marginal valuations, the conditions on global revenues identied pre-
viously still hold, making sure that the change in global revenues (conditional on the
tax-harmonizing reforms) take the appropriate direction, conferring a positive welfare
gain. To emphasize:
Corollary 1 Under the conditions of Proposition 2, the tax-harmonizing reforms in (12)
and (13) deliver a potential Pareto improvement when public goods are local in nature.
We turn now to the case in which products are taxed in the country of origin.
5 Origin principle of taxation
The analysis in the case of origin-based taxation parallels that of the destination-based
taxation. To economize on space, we briey state the necessary modications of the
25This is easily seen from noticing that the slope of the Laer curve in the home country is given by
d(tdD)=dtd = (Q=e+ td) (De=Q) : With De=Q < 0; d(tdD)=dtd > 0 (implying that the home country is
on the left-hand-side of the Laer curve) if and only Q=e+td > _0: (Similarly for the foreign country). For
an example that demostrates transparently the existence of potential Pareto improvements under the
conditions of Proposition 2 see Appendix C. Examples for Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 are available
upon request.
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model to deal with this case.
Origin-based taxes are levied by (and revenues accrue to) the country in which the com-
modity is produced. International arbitrage then dictates that consumer prices across
countries are equalized. Denoting the international price of the good by Q and the
specic tax in the home (foreign) by to (t

o), rms maximize
 = (Q  to)X   C(X) ;  = (Q  to)X   C(X) : (22)
Making use of (1) and (3) gives the aggregate inverse demand given by
Q(X +X) ; (23)
with, following from (3),
Q0 = 1=(D0 +D0) < 0 : (24)
Prots maximization requires
Q+Q0X = C 0 + to ; Q+Q0X = C0 + to : (25)
Revenues are used to provide public goods
G = toX ; G
 = toX
 : (26)
Indirect utility is still given by (11). We turn now to a discussion of origin-based tax-
harmonizing reforms and to a search of potential Pareto improvements.
Origin-based tax-harmonizing reforms
Under the origin principle the tax-harmonizing reform is
dto
dto

= 

 (Ho   to)
  (Ho   to)

; (27)
where  is a small positive number,  ;   are arbitrary positive numbers and Ho|the
common target for the taxes|is given by
Ho =

 A
 A +  A

to +

 A
 A +  A

to ; (28)
where
A = Q0   C 00 < 0 ; A = Q0   C00 < 0 ; (29)
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with the inequality sign following from the fact that Q0 < 0; C 00; C00  0. Interestingly,
the (strictly positive) weights attached to the origin-based taxes in (28) depend upon
both demand, through (24), and supply responses. Following from (27) and (28), it is
the case that
dto =
  A
 A +  A
(to   to) ; dto =  
  A
 A +  A
(to   to) ; (30)
and so26
1
A
dto =   1
A
dto : (31)
Notice that (a claim shown in Appendix B) the implication of (31) is that world-consumer
price, Q, is unaected, and as a consequence both countries' demands are unaected,
too.
Perturbing now (11) and adding to its foreign analogue|after using (30)|one obtains
dV + dV  = [( G +  G   1) (to + AX)  ( G +  G   1) (to + AX) + (C0   C 0)]
  
 A +  A
(to   to) : (32)
The level of generality of (32)|as was the case under the destination principle of
taxation|posses a signicant problem in the attempt to evaluate the welfare conse-
quences of the origin-based tax-harmonizing reforms in (27) and (28). In this case too,
however, there are instances in which the reforms, starting from any tax-distorting equi-
librium to 6= to, attain a potential Pareto improvement.
One such instance is when global public good provision follows the (modied) Samuelson
rule in both countries (in the sense that  G +  

G = 1 and also  

G +  G = 1). In this
case (32) reduces to
dV + dV  = (C0   C 0)   

 A +  A
(to   to) : (33)
Inspection of (33) reveals that the origin-based tax-harmonizing reform is potentially
Pareto improving whenever C0   C 0 has the opposite sign of to   to that is, if and only
if the high tax country is also the country with the lower marginal cost of producing
the tradeable good. There is some straightforward intuition behind this. Notice that, as
26This is in contrast to the linear demand and constant marginal cost case analyzed in Kotsogiannis
and Lopez-Garcia (2007) where the weights A and A in (31) vanish leaving dto =  dto.
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already noted, the tax-harmonizing reforms ensure that the world consumer price remains
at the pre-reform level and as a consequence the demands in both countries remain
unchanged. What changes, as a consequence of tax harmonization, is the production
pattern of the tradeable good across the two countries. Suppose, that, without loss of
generality, to > to and so it is the foreign country that is the high tax one. In this
case, following (33), dV + dV  > 0 if and only if the foreign country is the country
that produces the tradeable good more eciently, in the sense that C 0 > C0. Since tax
harmonization calls for a reduction in to (and an increase in to), what eectively the tax
reform does is to reallocate production from the home country (the inecient one) to
the foreign country (the ecient one). To emphasize:
Proposition 3 With taxes being levied under the origin principle and public goods being
global, starting from any tax-distorting equilibrium in which to 6= to, the tax-harmonizing
reforms in (27) and (28) deliver a potential Pareto improvement if both countries follow
the (modied for the case of global public goods) Samuelson rule of global public good
provision and sign[C0   C 0] =sign[to   to] (that is, if the country with the inecient
rm is also the low tax country).
Outside the case emphasized by Proposition 3 (and the more general cases identied
shortly below) ineciencies from global public good provision will still linger making the
welfare eects of tax harmonization indeterminate. A policy that improves this, as noted
earlier for the destination case, is the use of unrequited transfers that can be optimally
set|implying that  G +  

G =  G +  

G  Eo|but also the tax-harmonizing reforms
to satisfy a condition on global revenue change whose sign is in accordance with the
under-provision/over-provision of global public goods, relative to the Samuelson rule.
To identify these rewrite (32) as
dV + dV  = (Eo   1) d (G+G) + (C0   C 0)   

 A +  A
(to   to) ; (34)
where
d (G+G) = [(to + AX)  (to + AX)]
  
 A +  A
(to   to) : (35)
Thus, it is the case that dV + dV  > 0 if the change in global tax revenues (conditional
on the reforms) d (G+G) takes the sign of Eo   1 but also C0  C 0 takes the opposite
sign of to   to. Summarizing:
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Proposition 4 With taxes being levied under the origin principle and public goods being
global, starting from any tax-distorting equilibrium in which the country with the inef-
cient rm is also the low tax country, the tax-harmonizing reforms in (27) and (28)
deliver a potential Pareto improvement if there exist unrequited transfers that can be
optimally set, and the tax-harmonizing reforms are conditional revenue increasing (de-
creasing) when the global public goods are under-provided (over-provided) relative to the
Samuelson rule.
Outside the cases emphasized in Propositions 3 and 4, it is still possible (as with the
destination principle) to identify situations in which the tax-harmonizing reform delivers
a potential Pareto improvement even without recourse to unrequited transfers. To see
this, suppose that to > to and C
0 < C 0|that is it is the foreign country that is both
the high tax and the most ecient one|and both countries under-provide the global
public good|with respect to the Samuelson rule of Proposition 3|in the sense that
 G +  

G > 1 and  G +  

G > 1. Then, the tax-harmonizing reforms in (27) and
(28) deliver a potential Pareto improvement whenever (to + AX)   (to + AX) < 0, a
condition that, as before, relates to the relative positions of the two countries on own
Laer curve. The implication of the tax-harmonizing reform, then, is that it decreases
(increases) the tax rate of the high (low) tax country, which is also the country for which
the marginal eect on revenue is suciently large. This implies that both countries gain
in revenues and, therefore, in global public good provision.27
Tax harmonization is also desirable|again starting from any tax-distorting equilibrium|
even if governments provide local public goods. The reason is as before: Unrequited
transfers between governments are needed in order to equalize the marginal valuations
from local public good consumption (and not internalize global externalities as in the case
of global public goods), replacing (19) with  G =  

G  Eo. With equalized marginal
valuations, the conditions on global revenues identied previously still hold, making sure
that the change in global revenues (conditional on the tax-harmonizing reforms) takes
the appropriate direction, conferring a positive welfare gain. It is, thus, the case that:
Corollary 2 Under the conditions of Proposition 4, the tax-harmonizing reforms in (27)
27Appendix C develops and an example that demostrates the existence of potential Pareto improve-
ments under the conditions of Proposition 4. Examples for Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 exist and are
available upon request.
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and (28) deliver a potential Pareto improvement when public goods are local in nature.
The results established emphasize that, interestingly, tax harmonization in the presence
of public goods deserves more attention than it has typically received. There is certainly
pause for thought in the simple fact that a combination of tax harmonization and a
proper role for a way to allocate global revenues can increase aggregate welfare.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has introduced global public goods in an imperfectly competitive frame-
work and identied reasonably plausible conditions under which, starting from any tax-
distorting equilibrium, destination- and origin-based tax-harmonizing reforms are poten-
tially Pareto improving. The rst condition (unrequited transfers between governments)
requires that transfers are designed in such a way that the overall gains from the pro-
vision of global public goods are distributed among countries, whereas the second one
(conditional revenue changes) ensures that any excess revenue gain (or loss) to be had
is distributed in accordance with the extent of under-provision/over-provision of global
public goods, relative to the Samuelson rule. Under these conditions, tax harmonization
results in a potential Pareto improvement. And, interestingly, this is true independently
of the tax principle in place (destination or origin).
One can certainly question the feasibility of optimal unrequited transfers (more than
the requirement for conditional revenue changes) that redistributes the gains of tax
harmonization.28 Though this appears certainly to be an unwanted additional scal
instrument that works independently of tax harmonization, it is something that multi-
country scal systems (like the European Union) cannot dispense with. For, given the
tax base asymmetries that exist between the coordinating countries, there is always a
need for allocating resources between them eciently. In scal federal systems|like,
for example, Canada|such reallocation of revenues takes place via intergovernmental
transfers between governments that accounts for the deviation of a jurisdictional unit's
tax base from the national tax base. The system of allocation of revenues between
governments adopted here is the simplest one that one can think of, thereby increasing
the attractiveness of tax-harmonization.
28It is nevertheless|as noted in the introductory section|used widely in the literature.
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What is, thus, important, is that one does not take a negative view of tax harmonization.
To the contrary, as the analysis has shown here, careful scal policy can harness the
strengths of tax harmonization for the social good.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Proof of the statement that the reform in (12) and (13) implies that dP =
dX = dX = 0.
Re-write, for convenience, the market clearing condition in (3) and the rst order con-
ditions in (9) and (10) given by, respectively,
D +D = X +X ; (A.1)
P 0X + P = C 0 ; (A.2)
P 0X + P = C0 : (A.3)
Equations (A.1)-(A.3) dene the equilibrium of output and the world producer price
of the tradeable good. Notice that suciency for the choice of X and X requires,
respectively, that
XX  d = 2P 0 +XP 00   C 00 < 0 ; (A.4)
and
XX  d = 2P 0 +XP 00   C00 < 0 : (A.5)
It is also assumed that
XX  d = P 0 +XP 00 < 0 ; (A.6)
XX  d = P 0 +XP 00 < 0 ; (A.7)
and so the rms' best response functions are downward sloping in quantity space. Sta-
bility of equilibrium (in the Cournot stage) requires that
d = d

d   dd > 0 : (A.8)
Perturbation (abusing notation somewhat) of (A.1)-(A.3)|after using the fact that,
following from the demand functions, dD = D0 (dP + dtd) (dD = D0(dP + dtd)), but
also that P 0 = (D0 +D0) 1|gives in matrix form264 1  P
0  P 0
1 d   P 0 d   P 0
1 d   P 0 d   P 0
375
264 dPdX
dX
375 =
264  P
0D0dtd   P 0D0dtd
0
0
375 : (A.9)
It can be easily veried that the determinant of the left-hand-side matrix is given by
(A.8). As is typically the case, without further restrictions on the structure of the
model the comparative statics are indeterminate. This, in the present context, is not
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problematic: All that is required here is that the comparative statics are `well dened'
in the sense that the coecients of the components of D0dtd +D0dtd, are non-zero. It
is assumed this to be the case. Solving the system of equations in (A.9) for dP; dX and
dX one obtains
dP =  P 0d   P
0 [(d + d)  (d + d)]
d
(D0dtd +D0dtd) ; (A.10)
dX =
(d   d)P 0
d
(D0dtd +D0dtd) ; (A.11)
dX =
(d   d)P 0
d
(D0dtd +D0dtd) : (A.12)
Close inspection of (A.10) reveals that if D0dtd+D0dtd = 0, then, dP = dX = dX
 = 0.

Appendix B
Proof of the statement that the reform in (27) and (28) implies that dQ = 0.
Re-write, for convenience, the market clearing condition in (3) and the rst order con-
ditions in (25)
D +D = X +X ; (B.1)
Q+Q0X = C 0 + to ; (B.2)
Q+Q0X = C0 + to: (B.3)
Equations (B.1)-(B.3) dene the equilibrium of output and the world consumer price
of the tradeable good. Notice that suciency for the choice of X and X requires,
respectively, that
XX  o = 2Q0 +XQ00   C 00 < 0 ; (B.4)
and
XX  o = 2Q0 +XQ00   C00 < 0 : (B.5)
It is also assumed that
XX  o = Q0 +XQ00 < 0 , (B.6)
XX  o = Q0 +XQ00 < 0 , (B.7)
and so the rms' best response function are downward sloping in quantity space. Stability
of equilibrium (in the Cournot stage) requires that
o = o

o   oo > 0 : (B.8)
20
Perturbing now (B.1)-(B.3) gives (again abusing notation somewhat) in matrix form264 1  Q
0  Q0
1 o  Q0 o  Q0
1 o  Q0 o  Q0
375
264 dQdX
dX
375 =
264 0dto
dto
375 : (B.9)
Solving the system of equations in (B.9) for dQ; dX and dX one obtains
dQ =
Q0
o
[(o   o) dto + (o   o) dto] ; (B.10)
dX =
1
o
(odto   odto) ; (B.11)
dX =   1
o
(odto   odto) : (B.12)
Since
o   o = Q0   C00  A ; (B.13)
and
o   o = Q0   C 00  A ; (B.14)
it is the case that, following from (31), the origin-based tax-harmonizing reforms imply
that dQ = 0. 
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Appendix C
Destination principle: Numerical example based on Proposition 2.
To simplify matters, suppose that both demands and costs functions are linear and given,
respectively, by
D = a  Q ; D = a   Q ; (C.1)
C = cX ; C = cX (C.2)
and so
P 0 =   ( + ) 1 ; (C.3)
and the utility the consumer derives from global public goods in the home (foreign)
country is  (G;G) ( (G; G)). It can be easily shown, in this case, that (A.10)-(A.12)
reduce to, respectively,
dP =  (b=3) (dtd + dtd) ; (C.4)
dX = dX =  (1=3) (dtd + dtd) ; (C.5)
and that, by making use of,
dD =   (dP + dtd) ; dD =   (dP + dtd) ; (C.6)
perturbation of the home country utility function in (11) gives
dV =
b
3

D   2X + 3
b
D ( G   1)  (2 + 3)  Gtd +  Gtd

dtd
+
b
3

D   2X +  Gtd + 3
b
 GD
   (2 + 3)  Gtd

dtd . (C.7)
(An analogous condition applies to the foreign country). Non-cooperative taxes (denoted
by the subscript N) are given by setting the derivative of (C.7) with respect to td equal
to zero, that is
tNd =
[(2 + 3)  G [b (D   2X) + 3D ( G   1)] +  G [b (D   2X) + 3D ( G   1)]]
b [(2 + 3)  G (2 + 3)  G    G G]
;
(C.8)
(a similar expression holds for td).
Suppose now that the demand parameters are a = 10 a = 9;  = 1:2;  = 1:3; the
marginal utilities of the public goods are  G = 1:9;  G = 1:2;  

G = 1:1;  

G = 1:8|
implying that  G +  

G = 3 =  G +  

G > 1 (and so global public goods are under-
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provided with respect to the Samuelson rule)|the costs are c = 5 > c = 4; and the
reform parameters are given by  = 1 =   and  = 1:
It is the case that (computation performed with MAPLE v12|and all numbers have
been rounded to two decimal points) D = 2:25; D = 1:63; P = 5:28; X = 0:69;
X = 3:19 and tNd = 1:18, t
N
d = 0:39 (and so it is the home country that is the high
tax country). Adding (C.7) and its foreign counterpart gives dV + dV  = 0:56 > 0 and
so tax harmonization is welfare improving. It is easy also to verify that (following (21))
d (G+G) = 0:09 (with (Q=e+ td)  (Q=e + td) = 0:17 > 0).
Origin principle: Numerical example based on Proposition 4.
Following the same steps as above it is the case that
dQ = (1=3) (dto + dt

o) ; (C.9)
dX = (1=3b) (dto   2dto) ; (C.10)
dXj = (1=3b) (dto   2dto) : (C.11)
Perturbing (11) the non-cooperative origin-based tax in the home country is given by
tNo =
1
(4 G G    G G)
[2 Gb [( 4X  D) + 3 GX] + b G [( 4X  D) + 3 GX]] ;
(C.12)
(an analogous condition holds for the foreign country).
Suppose now that demand parameters are a = 20; a = 14;  = 1:8;  = 1:9, the
marginal utilities of the public goods are  G = 1:7;  G = 1:6;  

G = 1:8;  

G = 1:9;
whereas the costs are c = 2 > c = 1; and the reform parameters  = 1;   = 1;  = 1:
Then it is the case that D = 12:11; D = 5:67; Q = 4:38; X = 8:28; X = 9:50; and
tNo = 0:81 > t
N
o = 0:14 (so the foreign country is the high tax one). Then, in this case,
dV +dV  = 2:29 > 0; (with dG+dG = 0:42; and (to + AX) (to + AX) =  0:34 < 0):

23
References
Bjorvatn, K., and Schjelderup, G., (2002), Tax competition and international public
goods, International Tax and Public Finance, 9, 111-120.
Delipalla, S., 1997, Commodity tax harmonization and public goods, Journal of Public
Economics, 63, 447-466.
Hashimzade, N., Khovadaisi, H. and Myles, G. D., 2005, Tax principles, product dif-
ferentiation and the nature of competition, International Tax and Public Finance,
12, 695{712.
Hashimzade, N., Khovadaisi, H. and Myles, G. D., 2011, Country characteristics and
preferences over tax principles, International Tax and Public Finance, 18, 214{232.
Hauer, A., and M. Puger, 2004, International commodity taxation under monopolis-
tic competition, Journal of Public Economic Theory 6(3), 445-470.
Hauer, A., Schjelderup, G., Stahler, F., 2000. Commodity taxation and international
trade in imperfect markets. CESifo Working Paper No. 376.
Karakosta, O. (2009). PhD Thesis, Athens University of Economics and Business.
Keen, M. J., 1987, Welfare eects of commodity tax harmonization, Journal of Public
Economics, 33, 107-114.
Keen, M. J., 1989, Pareto-improving indirect tax harmonization, European Economic
Review, 33, 1-12.
Keen, M. J., and Lahiri, S., 1993, Domestic tax reform and international oligopoly.
Journal of Public Economics, 51, 55{74.
Keen, M., and Lahiri, S., 1998, The comparison between destination and origin princi-
ples under imperfect competition, Journal of International Economics, 45, 323{350.
Keen, M. J., S. Lahiri, and P. Raimondos-Mller, 2002, Tax principles and tax harmo-
nization under imperfect competition: A cautionary example, European Economic
Review, 46, 1559-1568.
Keen, M. J., and C. Kotsogiannis, 2012, Coordinating climate and trade policies: Pareto
eciency and the role of border tax adjustments, mimeo, University of Exeter.
Kotsogiannis, C., and M-A. Lopez-Garcia, 2007, Imperfect competition, indirect tax
harmonization and public goods, International tax and Public Finance, 14, 135-
149.
Kotsogiannis, C., Lopez-Garcia, M.-A., & Myles, G. D., 2005, The origin principle, tax
harmonization and public goods. Economics Letters, 87, 211{219.
Lahiri, S., and P. Raimondos-Mller, 1998, Public good provision and the welfare eects
of indirect tax harmonization, Journal of Public Economics, 67, 253-267.
Lockwood, B, 1997, Can commodity tax harmonization be Pareto-improving when
governments supply public goods?, Journal of International Economics, 43, 387-
408.
24
Lockwood, B., 2001, Tax Competition and tax coordination under destination and
origin principles: A Synthesis, Journal of Public Economics 81, 279{319.
Lopez-Garcia, M-A., 1996, The origin principle and the welfare gains from indirect tax
harmonization, International Tax and Public Finance, 3, 83-93.
Lopez-Garcia, M-A., 1998, On welfare and revenue eects of indirect tax harmonization,
Economics Letters, 60, 185-193.
Navrouzoglou, P., 2012, Pollution externalities and tax principles, mimeo, University
of Exeter.
Sandmo, A., 2006, Global public economics: Public goods and externalities, NHH
Discussion paper (SAM 32 2006).
Smart, M. (1998). Tax and deadweight loss in a system of intergovernmental transfers.
Canadian Journal of Economics, 31, 189{206.
Smart, M. (2007). Raising taxes through equalization. Canadian Journal of Economics,
40, 1188{1212.
Wildasin, D. (1989). Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a cor-
rective subsidy. Journal of Urban Economics, 25, 193{212.
Wildasin, D. (1991). Income redistribution in a common labor market. American
Economic Review 81, 757-774.
25
